My neighbour's offhand explanation revealed at least two things. First, politics may dictate what one gets to read. But there is something else, less obvious, less crude, and more deep-rooted in common assumptions about reading in China, both then and now. That is, reading is readily accepted as an easy and comfortable relation between the reader and the work. Whether Madam Mao was a fan of Becky is not important here, but the word 'like' in my neighbour's remark did not just mean an emotional response from an unsuspecting reader, nor a mirroring of the character by the reader -Madam Mao identifying with Becky and seeing her own life story played out in her -but a validating and self-validating process. Yet what does validation entail when such responses cross cultural boundaries? And what could one overlook by assuming such ease of relationship between reader and text? In this essay I will focus on an important idea about reading in the work of I. A. Richards. By examining how he articulates the notion of 'vigilance', that is, an unusually alert response from an active reader, I shall argue that the value of reading, especially cross-cultural reading, consists in the development of what I would call negative responses, by which I mean self-critique, which in Richards is characterised by uncertainty, discomfort, difficulty, contestation, and dissent. In the second half of the essay I shall extend this argument by examining several underlying issues of English literary education in China. Throughout my discussion, 'ethics' stands for its root meaning of 'ethos' or character, as well as its more contemporary connotation of relational normativeness.
In 1970, when Richards looked back on the years of his early project of Basic English, he made a comment about C. K. Ogden, his friend and collaborator who had died in 1957: 'in many ways, [Ogden had] the most gifted and alert mind I -and many othershave ever met'.
2 Being alert was a quality Richards had admired and tried to promote in several of his works. The term he employed was 'vigilance', which he borrowed from Henry Head, the British neurologist. To contrast the behaviour 'of the sleepy and the fully awake, of the normal man with the lightly and the more deeply anaesthetized patient, of the starved or fevered with the healthy', wrote Richards in his Principles of Literary Criticism, 'Dr. Head has recently suggested the Red Capital). It was nearly thirty years after the initial publication of Comrade Chiang Ch'ing in 1977 (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown) that a Chinese translation of the complete book became available in mainland China.
2 John Paul Russo, I. A. Richards: His Life and Work (Baltimore 1989) p. 441.
term vigilance '. 3 In Henry Head, vigilance had much to do with neural force, or the efficiency and intensity of physiological response. Richards's interest in evoking the term ranged more widely. The convergence in his work of psychological and intellectual sources is well known: pragmatism, mentalism, Jeremy Bentham, and Matthew Arnold, among others. 4 For example, John Bowen long ago singled out Practical Criticism as a book that 'powerfully brings together the "discourse of society" with the "discourse of consciousness" ' . 5 Yet if we read this book carefully, we will also find these two discourses playing different, though complementary, roles. Richards's discussion of psychological experiments in reading, including those of 'vigilance', is extended in later chapters of Practical Criticism in more speculative and philosophical terms. These chapters not only present the underlying thinking of his 'science' of reading, but also argue for its value for personal development. While the technical language offers a way for Richards to sort out and articulate notions such as vigilance, and to 'give psychology a leg up' 6 by theorising discriminating analysis, it is the values he derives from his science of reading that provide the sufficient conditions of his arguments. They certainly deserve more critical attention.
Richards's conception of vigilance, when compared with that of Henry Head, is predictably more aesthetic and speculative, given his literary interests. But it is also more normative. Richards divides vigilance into two related types: the vigilance of the poet, and that of the reader responding to that of the poet. A vigilant poet must have two qualities. First, he or she is able to revive the details and impact of past experience far more effectively than others, having been particularly open-minded and sensitive when registering the experience (PLC, p. 169) . Then the poet must be unusually discerning in detecting how meaning is configured through words, and unusually deft in marshalling these words. Seen in these terms, Thomas Gray's Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard, for example, is about an ordinary experience but by a poet with extraordinary sensibilities. What is unique are 'the peculiarities of tone and sequence of feeling' and 'the qualities … that belong to Gray, not to the common stock from which it develops' (PC, p. 253). The connections of meanings forged so vigilantly would be fluid and dynamic in setting free the poet's impulses. A vigilant reader has a number of qualities. Like a vigilant poet, he or she is unusually sharp in identifying the 'configurations' of meanings through words, 7 or through the art of language. In addition, he or she is particularly disposed to gauge the underlying values of these configurations and organise his or her response coherently. He or she needs to be alert to how the 'separate effects [of words] in the mind combine' or 'how they fit into the whole response'.
8 Of these two types of vigilance, I shall mainly discuss the vigilance of the reader.
The way Richards defines vigilance in Henry Head reveals a fundamental aspect of his own idea of vigilance: 'In a high state of vigilance the nervous system reacts to stimuli with highly adapted, discriminating, and ordered responses ' (PLC, p. 169) . In this definition, Richards has, perhaps without knowing it, pinpointed what is arguably the most important aspect of Head's conception. In an article published in the British Journal of Psychology in 1923, Head discusses the process of patients regaining neural movements after spinal injuries. He defines vigilance as involving the efforts of the body, rather than as mere enhanced nervous reflexes: vigilance is expressed in heightened extensor postural tone and acutely differentiated responses. This high state of physiological efficiency differs from a pure condition of raised excitability; for although the threshold value of the stimulus is not of necessity lowered, it is associated not only with an increased reaction but with highly adapted responses. These may vary profoundly according to circumstances, which are not inherent in the nature of the stimulus.
9
Vigilance is thus a differentiated and organised response to circumstances. It seems that, rather than merely borrowing the term 'vigilance' from Head, Richards has allowed this emphasis on the agency of the body to become one on the agency of the self in his idea of literary vigilance, by Psychology, 14 (1923) pp. 126-47: 133. basing his conception on a self-conscious response to language. In fact, Richards sees our constitution in terms of responsive systems (SP, p.17), hence his insistence on the reflexive participation of one's mind in reading. Responding to a poem in 'a high state of vigilance' implies that reading is primarily a 'conscious' activity (PLC, pp. 169, 22) .
But why should one read vigilantly? Richards finds in such a mode of reading the means to realise the cognitive potential of the poetic form. High sensitivity is essential because poetry presents what would otherwise be hidden from observation or beyond expression. In Thomas Carlyle, the story is an indispensable medium for accessing the past. Carlyle sees the causes of historical events as multi-dimensional, that is, like a solid. Narrative, being linear, would be limited in representing these causes. Yet the story is perhaps the best recourse for capturing the spirit of the past.
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It approaches the past as situations, events, relations, and processes, and reconceives it imaginatively as the present. In the same vein, Richards sees the poetic form as most decisive in articulating the poet's feelings and attitudes, that is, through enacting them: 'Most of the attitudes with which poetry is concerned are indescribable … and can only be named or spoken about indirectly through the situations (typically poems) which evoke them' (SP, p. 49).
In Richards, three qualities are thus essential for a vigilant reader: the ability to recognise or identify the art of language; the ability to discriminate between different verbal uses and between the different values implicated; and the ability to order or organise one's responses. This is because 'The most extensive changes in milieu take no effect if we remain insensitive to them' (SI, p. 174). Let us go over these three aspects one by one. A highly responsive reader does not read for the familiar but for the unique and peculiar in a poem, including what may defamiliarise. Being alert requires much patience, and an open and yet precise mind. To cultivate acute recognition is to remedy the overwhelming influence of one's stock responses. Personal associations, for example, while inevitably impinging on the reading process, have to be suspended if they are 'irrelevant' to the poem. 'The art of thought, the subtlety of genius, is in finding a dimension along which the protectiveness of habits can lapse' (SI, p. 174). Richards's fear is of what he calls 'bad reading … reading that prevents the reader … from entering into the poem' (PC, p. 233), or reading that projects into the text what is not there. Responding is not about message-hunting but about making 'provisional acceptances' of meaning and moving beyond (PLC, p. 261) . It is a process of pushing oneself constantly out of one's comfort zone, and of being on the lookout for the unexpected. This willingness to take risks, take stock, and move on intimates a philosophy that is emotionally subtle and intellectually agile. It accepts hermeneutical 'loss' by refusing to take it as a philosophical end and by turning it into a heuristic necessity.
A poem thus offers a rich resource that can be accessed repeatedly but never exhausted. It is not a state waiting to be discovered. To take note of the unusual in reading means to read against the recalcitrance of words. The conscious activity of recognising is not a one-way process. The reader needs to make himself or herself susceptible to the poem. He or she is in for an encounter and a challenge. 'To be cognisant of anything, to know it, is to be influenced by it; to desire, to seek, to will anything is to act towards it' (PLC, p. 79). In this sense, a poem is object as well as experience. Its meaning consists of both sense and feeling. On the other hand, although he or she has to want to know, the reader should not be totally unsuspecting or unsuspicious. To be vigilant in discerning the unusual is not about how quickly one can detect, but about how quickly one can resist rushing through, or falling prey to 'an instantaneity which has led many critics to undervalue the work of intellectual analysis in the reading of poetry' (PC, p. 214). Richards makes a subtle point: 'To triumph over the resistances of words may sometimes be considered the measure of a poet's power … but more often it is the measure of his discretion, and a reader who is aware of the complexity and delicacy of the reconciliations of diverse feelings that poetry effects will walk as carefully ' (PC, .
It is in these terms of self-conscious measure that Richards makes a clear distinction between 'enjoying' and a more thoughtful and reasoned response. Responding by 'enjoying' shows that a reader is entering the poem too 'thoroughly'. A thoughtful response, on the other hand, would change the reader who 'would no longer be able to enjoy ' (PLC, p. 190) . This seems to mean that, for Richards, to move beyond the comforting and confirmatory responses of 'enjoying' or 'liking' a work is to affirm the constant need to develop a critical distance, to see vigilance as both aesthetically and normatively transcendent. Richards here runs the risk of invalidating 'enjoying' as a response altogether. But to do otherwise might replace his prescriptive tenet with a taxonomical category. On the other hand, one could always evaluate unknowingly and understate evaluation as mere enjoying or liking: we enjoy something because we think it is special. Richards does not seem to be concerned with whether one should enjoy but with the need to have a perspective on such enjoyment. What he does not address sufficiently in discussing 'enjoying', though, is a more challenging question. Where do we draw the line, since enjoying may elide into reasoned response, or vice versa, and since such reasoning can evolve into an obsession with difficulty for its notional value?
The second constitutive quality of vigilant reading is discrimination in interpretation. This is because, for Richards, misinterpretation is 'the normal and probable event' (PC, p. 336). A reader needs to compare a writer's specific choice of words with the range of possibilities he or she is familiar with or could conceive of. By taking into account multiple possibilities in this way, the attentive reader enacts the complexity and even indeterminacy of the writing experience, in working out 'the cross-implications, affiliations and discrepancies of senses ' (PC, . So discrimination here is not about 'dictionary understanding' (PC, p. 328), but about uncovering the structure of the 'sequence of reflections and attitudes' in the poem (PC, p. 206): 'No one who has repeatedly lived through experiences at the level of discrimination and coordination presupposed by the greater writers, can ever, when fully "vigilant", be contented with ordinary crudities' (PLC, p. 216). It is in this sense that language becomes the 'art of comparison and contrast' 11 that may '[shake] our minds out of the routine of expectation' (PC, p. 238).
To discriminate is thus to become alert to relations of meanings and 'their interferences' (PC, p. 339). What language offers is choice rather than facts. Language is 'our chief exerciser of Choice' (SI, p. 135). The reader's discriminating ability, or 'discursive intelligence' (PC, p. 213), has to be sharp but also sustained. But this also means reading could become a process of reflection which, in Richards's words, 'often takes the form of inconclusive worrying' (SP, p. 17), generating uncertainty and insecurity through a continual process of trial and error. Central to this emphasis on discriminating is Richards's belief that words have 'a personality like that of a human being'.
12 A reader needs to be highly alert to the mapping of the 'personality' of words or, shall we say, the ethos embedded in a poem. Sifting through the structure of meaning is a necessary way to access this inner pattern which, like Hopkins's 'inscape', has to be encountered holistically. But the interpretative risk may come from other variables, including, for example, the reader's own 'personality': 'A difference in opinion or taste may be due to a misunderstanding of the meaning of a passageon one side of the dispute or both. But it may be due to an opposition of temperaments, to some difference in the direction of our interests' (PC, p. 347).
The mode of discriminating may come across as a technical sequence that exercises the mind over meaning, or sorts out meanings democratically. It cannot help but gauge, though, the values these meanings may carry. It is a mode of responding to the 'psychology of the speech-situation' (PC, p. 339) and the relations between ideas and experience. The need to be challenged by sorting out such values independently could account for why Richards opted out of the tradition of German philology in the first place, as he saw the need to remedy the reductive approach in linguistic training of his day that only supplied 'one or other of a number of frameworks of doctrine into which we are taught to force all the material we would handle' (PC, p. 344). A discriminating mode of independent reading will be trying as it tests out the limits of one's judgement. In this, it is also historically rooted; it could challenge any wilful adherence to prevalent concepts or terms, especially at a time when distinctions for his contemporaries were becoming 'increasingly abstract and intangible, and therefore more word-dependent' (PC, p. 344). Frank Kermode best articulates this position by recommending 'vigilance', in Richards's sense, in terms of 'the discriminating of value '. 13 For this reason, the ability to discriminate matters far more than what one works through. Not being vigilant does not mean paying insufficient attention but paying the wrong kind of attention, which would affect 'the health of the mind' (PLC, p. 54). To compare requires the mind to inhibit some responses in favour of others. For us, this type of discrimination could set some values above others and would be politically biased, but Richards's intellectual disposition is more generous. For the reader, to sift through these feelings and values is to determine how to place them, or, through this, to reflect on his or her own categories of analysis. Richards constantly calls for 'greater suppleness' of the mind to overcome rigidity (PC, p. 343), and to refuse to fix standards. This is because 'artificial fixations of attitudes' will enable one to face 'fictions' rather than 'facts' (PLC, p. 189). To elevate facts over fiction could easily turn his technical approach into scientism. But by integrating facts into openness of mind, Richards's mode of articulation becomes in itself a creative response to the long-standing debate, going as far back as Bentham and J. S. Mill, about whether literary study is inferior for not being scientific and thus not truthful. It is in these terms that we should understand why, for 13 Frank Kermode, 'The Discipline of Literature', Modern Language Review, 93/4 (1998) pp. xxxi-xli: xxxvii.
Richards, it is only by keeping possibilities open and accessible and by not being content with one's own reading that one can become 'exacting' in reading, 'in the sense of noticing with discrimination what feeling we apprehend, not, of course, in the sense of constantly demanding certain definite feelings from us' (PC, p. 328).
But the most meaningful component of Richards's conception of vigilant reading is the reader's ability to 'order' or 'organize' his or her responses appropriately and with 'coherence'. Richards's emphasis on this mental 'equilibrium of opposed impulses' (PLC, p. 235) reflects his more general idea of 'synaesthesis', an aesthetic synthesis that presupposes a range of configuring forces and holistic analyses.
14 His language may sound overly prescriptive and idealistic: Richards can be vague in using words such as 'coherent', 'appropriate', 'exact', 'perfect', 'precise', or 'disinterested'. They often render his idea of vigilance more vulnerable than it actually is; his language of perfectionism and precision gives the impression of working towards a static and obligatory end. But like Matthew Arnold's conception of the 'best self ', his perfectionism consists in a dynamic process towards an ideal, what one aspires to rather than what one achieves, a mode of living to be realised in terms of one's own conditioning rather than a fixed utopia to be actualised.
15 This is why, for C. K. Ogden, attention may only mean a 'disturbed system to regain equipoise', 16 but for Richards vigilant comprehension consists in 'selfordering and growth' (SI, p. 104). Growing as a defining component of mental equilibrium can be better clarified through Richards's conception of sincerity in reading. With a view to revising its meaning, Richards takes sincerity to be a quality that has 'run the gauntlet of self-criticism', what has been 'worked over and complicated by reflection' (PC, p. 282). Thus reading is a process one cannot go through unscathed. Drawing on the Confucian Chung Yung, he sees sincerity as 'the means to give full development to our own natures, to give full development to the nature of others, and very much more' (PC, p. 284 For an alert reader, freedom is both freedom to and freedom from, not just fleeing from received conventions and systems of thinking but also overcoming them in a self-consciously contrarian way. This is what Richards means when he uses, as he frequently does, the word 'unusual'. To order one's response to a poem is to reorder the context that gives rise to one's thought, one's accepted feelings and beliefs. One cannot become an alert reader without a visceral and existential self-restructuring, without being subject to a 'permanent alteration': 'Habits [of thought] … are not easy to throw off … when they do not come into open conflict with changing circumstances, or do not clearly involve us in loss or inconvenience' (SP, p. 16). If reflection often comes across as inconclusive uncertainty, 'that is no more than might be expected in view of the unparalleled difficulty of the task' (SP, p. 17). In the end, running through the 'gauntlet of self-criticism' would help to dislodge 'the Protective Troths', that is, one's 'faiths and loyalties … and commitments' (SI, p. 175). Like the 'detachment so often mentioned in artistic experience' (FA, p. 78), being vigilant is about reconfiguring critical intelligence dialectically rather than merely applying such intelligence. Richards's starting point may be an objection to what Bertrand Russell calls 'a purely prudential use of language' (PC, p. 324) -a conventional use that requires little precision for being conventional. Yet his purpose is best defined by J. S. Mill when Mill argues that only through vigorous and earnest contestation could an opinion or truth maintain 'its vital effect on the character and conduct'.
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On the other hand, for Richards, while vigilance may be a mode of reading poetry, reading can also become an important way to develop vigilance, which recalls Mill's idea of ethology. 'Poetry is failing us, or we it, if after our reading we do not find ourselves changed' in terms of 'our possibilities as responsive individuals' (SP, p. 47). Reading is to avoid 'the permanent … blanking out, through repeated and maintained inhibition, of aspects of experience that our mental health requires us sometimes to envisage' (PC, p. 268). In this sense, reading can be a diagnostic tool for the reader's historical conditions. For Richards, 'A sense of desolation, of uncertainty, of futility, of the groundlessness of aspirations, of the vanity of endeavour, and a thirst for a life-giving water which seems suddenly to have failed, are the signs in consciousness of this necessary reorganization of our lives' (SP, p. 64). Therefore the study of language 'must be … normative through and through': it is 'concerned -endlessly -with standards and validity' and 'has to be a dependent of … ethics' (SI, p. 122). The prospect of reconfiguring one's value structure underlies Richards's warning that the highly creative and discriminating behaviour of a vigilant mind, whether of the poet or reader, would 'cause dismay, irritation or envy, or to seem incomprehensible' (PLC, p. 169): 'The dangers to which he is exposed, the apparent inconsequence, the difficulty on many occasions of co-operating with him, of relying upon him, of predicting what he will do, are evident and often expatiated upon' (PLC, p. 170). But disorganisation and incomprehension precisely enact the critical event of original and creative reordering. Richards is clear about this: 'His superficial resemblance to persons who are merely mental chaoses, unorganized, without selective ability and of weak and diffused attention, is likewise clear. Essentially he is the opposite of these' (PLC, p. 170).
What is the relevance, then, of Richards's idea of 'vigilance' to a discussion of cross-cultural reading? Unlike his project of Basic English, or his idea of multiple definition, his conception of vigilance does not seem to be overtly cross-cultural. In my view, however, it may provide the terms for us to reflect on several issues of reading in English literary education in China. In this sense, his idea of vigilance is equally cross-culturally significant and consequential.
The difficulty for Chinese students reading English is in part the difficulty of reading cultural differences. Yet often what we should be alert to is similarities, or differences passing as similarities. It is legitimate and sometimes practically necessary for us to give up our native terms of reference in order to understand foreign literature (though even for a native speaker temporal difference in reading would be a form of cultural difference as well). But this can be problematic. Most of the time, students in China tend to search for concepts and terms in Chinese that they see as 'equivalents' which nevertheless may only partially overlap with those in English, if they do not differ altogether. Their attempts to understand often fall back on Chinese presuppositions that displace the configurations of meaning in English. The comfort of reading in Chinese becomes the comfort of reading English in Chinese. This tacit displacement exonerates the reader from further probing of the original context. In my recent teaching in China, I came across students who had an admirable knowledge of one of the latest critical models, which approaches genre history as evolution, but who had never read Charles Darwin. When I read with them the section on the struggle between species in The Origin of Species, they did not expect that, in Darwin, 'struggle' could mean mutual dependence and could result in the benefits of species. The Chinese translation for 'struggle' is often douzheng (斗争) which emphasises political strife or conflict rather than coping with difficulties. Many Chinese could readily relate douzheng to Mao's popular saying: 'We fight heaven and earth. We fight human beings and the pleasure is endless.' In contrast, Yan Fu, an early twentieth-century Chinese scholar, was more subtle in his translation of Huxley's discussion of the 'struggle for existence' and the 'survival of the fittest'. Knowing the context, Yan was careful to translate the phrase as wu jin tian ze (物竞天择). Jin (竞, to compete or contest) here accommodates the moral sense of collective need in Darwin but without losing the predominant emphasis on humans added by Herbert Spencer's social Darwinism. So to translate the word 'struggle' Yan had to negotiate conceptually the difference between Darwin and Spencer and between the East and the West. 18 To understand an English term in the original context does not mean to assimilate it but to detect the differences between what seem to be similarities in order to create a critical distance from what is familiar and taken for granted. This is no longer a question of reorganising our minds in the sense of learning new skills, but of unlearning old habits, of putting our own existential framework in perspective, of seeing why we used to read the way we did.
In this sense, to be vigilant in cross-cultural reading is not about reading the other in terms of the self (as an internalised reading), but about reading the self in terms of the other (by externalising it through speculation). Foreign literature is inherently disorientating and defamiliarising. Of course, one could argue that not taking the original meaning in the original context could be just as stimulating, productive, and thus valid. In this sense, whether one understands the original meaning or context would seem irrelevant. This argument might complicate Richards's view of irrelevant responses. If such responses stimulate new thinking of any kind, should they still be considered irrelevant? In my view, to approach cross-cultural reading in this 'generative' way may evade the cross-cultural terms altogether. We are practically talking about another question where intra-or cross-cultural becomes a non-issue, thus displacing the contention in the original question. It is true that one may still be stimulated by misreadings -understanding from another culture rarely corresponds to an indigenous reading. But this altered argument tends to presuppose an exclusive disposition of thinking and a pragmatic, if not utilitarian, mechanism of practice that could in the end cancel out the point of going beyond one's own culture. Such 'generative' reading, though meaningful in its own way, would have to depend on the assumption of an essentially intact subjectivity. This is in the end a question about whether there is any value in being fundamentally challenged as a reader.
For a significant number of Chinese students, the urge to rely on the security of one's own native epistemology often stems from a knowledgebased model of learning and the subconscious habit of falling back on established or institutionalised structures of thinking. Instead of offering choice, as Richards has suggested, language is often taken as presenting facts, thus replacing situations, problems, and issues by stripping facts of their problem-animated context. Answering a question means getting the one correct answer that is 'out there'. In this kind of learning, attention tends to be directed towards the description of literary movements and schools, and to how an individual writer or work fits into a linear and 'Whig' progression. For the past fifty years or so the way in which undergraduates have been introduced to English literary works in major Chinese universities seems to have encouraged this external approach. The first encounter with 'Eng. Lit.' for undergraduates has largely consisted of two companion courses called 'History of English Literature' and 'Selected Readings in English Literature', a model of genealogy and classification imported from the former Soviet Union in the 1950s. There is nothing wrong with reading for a knowledge of English literary history, but there is something wrong with reading for a grand narrative based on a designated textbook (sometimes by the Ministry of Education), and with projecting such a grand narrative back into a source book of readings. When two or three literary histories are available, instead of working out the 'problematic' of writing literary history or seeing the rationale behind different kinds of history, students often merge them into one definitive account of 'what happened'. Even at the graduate level, the study of individual writers and genres may still depend on one's received knowledge of them or on secondary criticism as knowledge. This approach would not encourage reflection on problems and thought processes, but is particularly conducive to the importation of critical terminology as labels: Romanticism, postcolonialism, cultural criticism, and so on. With the Victorians, the process of taxonomical labelling was precisely to contextualise what was being labelled and thus to cultivate the ability to observe and notice. That experiential freshness of reading seems to have been lost in much of the Chinese system. Here we can also see Richards's point in arguing against 'speculative elaboration divorced from experience' as the only mode of thinking (PC, p. 249; original emphasis). Three particular concerns in Richards can be enlightening here. First, knowledge gained at second hand is always necessary, but there is an entropy: 'there is always a loss in transmission which becomes more serious in proportion as what is transmitted is new, delicate and subtle, or departs in any way from what is expected' (PC, p. 248). In addition, ideas always distort, as a means of representation and as the result of the reader's vested interests:
An idea … is both very much less and very much more than a mental replica or copy of the thing it represents. It is less, because even the most elaborate idea falls short of the complexity of its object, is a sketch that is incomplete and probably distorts. It is more than a replica because besides representing the object it represents (in a different sense) our interest in the object. (PC, p. 247) Richards's caveat may be timely for an approach that favours terminologies and labels. Moreover, the factual approach to reading may tacitly displace one's thinking. There is the danger of taking '"recognized facts" as the natural basis of attitudes' (PLC, p. 264). Richards further specifies as follows: 'Facts, properly documented, are comforting things in an age which does not know what it is doing or in what to put its faith … . Facts are no true comforts until we know how to take them; and that is just our problem' (SI, p. 101).
A related issue is how originality in reading may be complicated by cultural differences. Reading originally is hard; reading another culture originally is never easy. Cross-cultural reading is different but not necessarily original simply by virtue of being different. Failure to realise this may result in a habit of mind that favours conciliation and harmony at the expense of the ground of conflict and the discordant process of harmonisation. For example, for many students in China harmony is only the homogenising resolution of conflict rather than a precarious holding-ground for new conflicts. In this sense, what I define as negative responses at the beginning of this essay may guard one against a static and superficial sense of harmony or an illusion of harmony, or against an impulse to desensitise oneself, that is, to suppress feelings of difficulty out of a pragmatic consideration for harmony. To be vigilant in cross-cultural reading has little to do with being notionally different but everything to do with being knowingly different, and with embracing the burden and demands of being different. Not being alert in reading accounts for a lack of originality in thinking, which seems to have caused much anxiety among students -especially graduate students reading English in China. They want to be original, but lack the commitment to move away from a secure and harmonising mindset. Too often, this lack of originality has been attributed to the pedagogical expectations of another system (the Anglo-American one, for example), or to a lack of knowledge of the research field. These may be valid reasons, but they often externalise what is an internal issue, reducing a question of thinking to one of practice.
What is perhaps feasible is for entry-level undergraduate students of English in China to adjust their expectations and objectives. The purpose of doing English should not be primarily learning the language as an instrument for communication, but rather engaging with alternative modes of thinking through learning the language. The instrumentalist approach would only desensitise students to modes of knowing and thinking that are deeply embedded in even elementary speech patterns and situations. The challenge, for both teachers and students, lies in cultivating the ability to detect them as differences. For beginning students, exposure is important. Sometimes one lecture or one instance of vigilant reading is sufficient to enable them to puzzle out by themselves what reading alertly would mean. They may be able to see it only here and there. But vigilance as a mental quality is cumulative. It is a sensibility rather than a skill. It shapes one's world-view rather than serving the learning of one subject area. In this sense, it may be more meaningful for a student to form a personal pattern of learning before any institutionalised training in vigilant reading becomes a reality. This is to say that self-learning as a process can be more creative and fruitful precisely because it demands more vigilance.
For Richards, to be a student is to detect the structure of teaching through learning. His idea of self-corrigible learning through Socratic selfteaching may offer us some food for thought. This mental exercise will force one to undertake a discriminating working-through, or an internal encounter with the material so as truly to connect with it. As Roland Barthes argued in 1963, it 'put[s] into the operation his "deepest self ", that is, his preferences, pleasures, resistances and obsessions'.
19 Frank Kermode's story of how, as a schoolboy in a remote area on the Isle of Man, he struggled with T. S. Eliot's The Waste Land and was determined to meet the challenge by teaching himself the poem, that is, through figuring out its internal relations, seems to enact beautifully this model of independent learning. 20 In the end, as Richards puts it, 'The mind that can shift its view-point and still keep its orientation, that can carry over into quite a new set of definitions the results gained through past experience in other frameworks, the mind that can rapidly and without strain or confusion perform the systematic transformations required by such a shift, is the mind of the future' (PC, p. 343).
Vigilance in cross-cultural reading also means to see oneself rationally. Richards's caveat may still be timely. What is sometimes overlooked is 'the distinction between a personal or idiosyncratic judgement and a normative' one (PLC, p. 210). 'A critic should often be in a position to say, "I don't like this but I know it is good", or "I like this and condemn it", or "This is the effect which it produces upon me, and this quite different effect is the one it should produce"' (PLC, p. 210). Vigilance consists in the exercise of independent thinking, which is an important aspect of originality. Independence as such can also prevent one from cruising through another culture with little friction or effort to attend to it, which could be either an innocent or a cynical refusal to engage with the other. In addition, if conventional systems of presupposition are collective in nature, then the need to cultivate vigilance may have to be conceived as collective as well. This approach could enable us to move beyond a battle of cultural superiority or sovereignty. Cross-cultural vigilance demands a significant degree of humility. A chapter epigraph in Richards's Practical Criticism provides more specific terms: 'One may inexorably reject theories that are contradicted by the very first steps in the analysis of observation, and yet at the same time be aware that those one holds oneself have only a tentative validity' (PC, p. 205). Richards's own discussion in this chapter -the dialectics of sense and feeling, and of reading as an emotional experience and critical thinking as judgement -shows his unusually sharp response to this quotation from Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle. We may extend Richards's point in more general terms of cross-cultural critique. That is, the validity of one's own position does not depend on the invalidity of the theory one rejects. Conversely, even if you know that your position is not impeccable, this lack of absolute validity should not stop you from being critical of other positions.
This question of vigilant reading is brought into sharper focus by the recent trend in Chinese universities whereby students from other departments of humanities and social sciences or even natural sciences start to take English courses. They may be fulfilling the requirements of a broad curricular model of liberal education, but they should also force English departments to define and rethink their specialised expectations, especially in the context of those of other humanities departments. This is a question not about what to read but about how to read. In his Idea of a University, John Henry Newman sees literature as having to do with thoughts and as involving a power of thinking that 'uses language in its full compass'. 
